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COMPETING FOR SKILLS:
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 1990
Susan Martin and B. Lindsay Lowell*
I. INTRODUCTION
MMIGRATION policies are the mix of international, national, and
local rules and programs that aim to facilitate the admission and inte-
gration of some foreigners and prevent the entry and stay of others.
This article examines U.S. policies on legal immigration, with particular
focus on the admission of highly skilled migrants.
The United States is a nation of immigrants. Americans share a com-
mon experience: they or their forebears left another country to begin
anew in the United States. Historically through the turn of the twentieth
century, immigrant newcomers came in waves that reinforced the na-
tional origin of their forebears, and the government minimally regulated
numbers or skills. That changed with legislation in the 1920s that intro-
duced restrictions based on national origins, followed by slow post-World
War II policy liberalization and the genesis of today's admission policies
in the 1960s. Now policymakers debate the merits of admitting immi-
grants primarily for their family ties, which essentially reinforces national
origin, compared with an emphasis on immigrants' skills.
Immigration to the United States has been of such volume and diver-
sity that there is an intrinsic acceptance, at times reluctantly, of the role
immigrants from diverse places play in constructing the "American."
Certainly, Canadians see themselves as a land of immigration, but the
British and French enterprises in Canada displace immigration as the
founding myth of the "Canadian" (Hawkins 1988:34). These national dif-
ferences have contributed to different historical justifications for similar,
exclusionary, admission policies. In either case, early U.S. and Canadian
immigration or admission policies from the turn-of-the-century were ex-
plicitly linked to immigrant or integration policy. Exclusionary policies
and restrictions on the number of immigrants were devised to address
integration concerns. Significant changes ensued in the two decades fol-
lowing the Second World War. The post-war policies repealed exclusion-
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ary Asian admission policies and, later, radically revised discriminatory
national-origin admissions in the 1960s.
In 1947, the Canadian Prime Minister called for immigration to bolster
the population, but in a selective manner related to absorptive capacity,
especially preservation of the national character (Hawkins 1991). The
Immigration Act of 1952 was the basis for much subsequent legislation
and gave the Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration
substantial power over admissions. In 1962, racial discrimination was re-
moved and the White Canada policy was essentially dead. In 1976, a new
Immigration Act established three classes of admission that continue to
characterize Canadian immigration: family, independent or point system,
and refugee. Its skilled component comprises about half of new admis-
sions and the composition of the new immigration is heavily Asian, with
some European representation and a lesser share from Latin America.
In the United States, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 re-
moved exclusion of Asian immigrants, though the numbers permitted re-
mained low. The Immigration Act of 1965 opened up immigration to all
countries on an equal basis. That Act also established a tripartite system
of family-based, employment-based, and refugee admission categories.1
Immigrants selected for their skills are a distinct minority of the legal and
gross flow into the United States. A partial response to the quest for
more highly skilled immigrants occurred in 1990 when the quota on immi-
grants admitted for economic reasons was raised from 54,000 to 140,000.
Nevertheless, for most of the 1990s, no more than 100,000 visas per
year were actually used for admission of employment-based immigrants,
partly because of inefficient processing systems. Even the employment
class is largely based on family ties, as the visa numbers include the work-
ing principal and his spouse and children. Perhaps no more than one-
third per year is composed of principals, the rest being their family mem-
bers. A backlog of employment-based immigrants waiting for admission
grew rapidly in the 1990s as the immigration bureaucracy failed to pro-
cess the applications in a timely fashion. It took as long as three to four
years for a visa to be approved, depending on the area of the country and
the whims of fate. Starting in 2000, a concerted effort cleared the backlog
generating numbers of more than 175,000 per year, but as of 2003, appli-
cants must once more wait two years or more for their visa to be
approved.
The 1965 U.S. policy, in tearing down the discriminatory framework of
the past, discarded the idea that people from certain national origins are
more easily integrated. Along with its principled construction of a system
dominated by family reunification, Congress embraced echoes of a
United States historically open to any person. Admission based on edu-
cation etc., would bar the poor (e.g., the "huddled masses"); overly selec-
1. Although not an admission category in any sense, unauthorized migration got its
impetus with the cessation of the legal Mexican agricultural-worker Bracero pro-
gram in 1962 and the failure to take steps to restrict illegal entry.
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tive admissions cut against American values. In contrast, Canadians
regularly state that admission policy needs to keep integration in mind.
Although admission policy in the "interests of those making applications
to immigrate" ultimately is guided by national interests "fairly narrowly
defined" (Trempe et al. 1997), Canadian admission, with an integration
objective, keeps in mind the private sector and public sector economies.
These differences may help explain Canadian policy that, relative to the
United States, favors selection of skilled migrants and varies levels of im-
migration according to economic cycle.
Immigration receives support in the United States for many reasons, as
stated by proponents of large-scale admissions. Immigrants contribute to
the economic well being of the United States through their skills, hard
work, entrepreneurial instincts, social security tax payments, and/or will-
ingness to take jobs unwanted by Americans (Smith and Edmonston
1997). Immigrants invigorate the social and cultural life of the country, as
witnessed by the diverse cuisine, literature, music, dance, and other art
forms brought by newcomers. Immigration is a constant reminder to na-
tives of what is special about the United States as a country that attracts
so many foreigners. Immigrants renew city neighborhoods that have
often fallen upon bad times, creating new businesses, buying homes, and
promoting community cooperation. Immigration strengthens U.S. eco-
nomic and political ties with other nations and our ability to compete in a
global economy and provide international leadership. As the U.S. Com-
mission on Immigration Reform asserted in 1997, "a properly regulated
system of legal permanent admissions serves the national interest" (U.S.
CIR 1997).
Of course, immigration has its detractors as well, who make one or more
of the following arguments. Immigration adds to U.S. population growth
and, therefore, to environmental and related problems (Beck 2001). Im-
migrants depress wages and working conditions, hurting especially un-
skilled U.S. workers, including previously arrived immigrants who can
easily be displaced by new immigrants willing to work at lower wages.
Immigrant workers willing to work at low wages can slow the moderniza-
tion and globalization of the U.S. economy. Some immigrants want pub-
lic support to retain their language and culture, provoking concerns that
programs such as bilingual schooling and preferences for minorities con-
tribute to the "dis-uniting" of America.
While the debate about immigration is often framed in pro- and anti-
immigration terms, the reality is different. Immigration can be more ef-
fectively seen as a series of trade-offs between competing goods. For ex-
ample, it is often argued that large-scale immigration is necessary to
"save" social security systems in the industrial countries (Moore 2001).
Immigration can play a role in increasing social security revenues by ad-
ding more taxpayers than beneficiaries, but much higher levels of immi-
gration would be needed to make a difference in the demography of the
country. Yet, if the composition of the immigrant flow remains un-
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changed, and many more unskilled immigrants enter, immigration may
make it harder for some disadvantaged U.S. workers, including the immi-
grants already in the U.S., to climb the job ladder. In this case, the com-
peting goods are high levels of benefits for retired persons who are living
longer, versus the competing good of restricting immigration to protect
especially low-wage workers. Deciding how to weigh the competing
goods of benefits for retirees and protecting U.S. workers can be a con-
tentious issue. The debate on legal admissions to the United States has
largely focused on the balance to be achieved in immigration policy.
II. ADMISSION CLASSES: PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY
Much of U.S. legal admissions policy was formulated in the 1960s, with
some changes in 1990 to reflect new realities. The following sections set
out the broad outlines of U.S. policy today, with discussion of some of the
most pressing issues on the U.S. immigration agenda.2
A. PERMANENT IMMIGRATION
During the 1990s, the United States admitted about 825,000 legal immi-
grants each year, up from about 600,000 a year in the 1980s (not counting
those legalized under the 1986 amnesty), 450,000 a year in the 1970s, and
330,000 a year in the 1960s. As immigration was increasing, the major
countries of origin changed from Europe to Latin America and Asia.
Permanent immigrants-"green carders"-are persons who are enti-
tled to live and work permanently in the United States and, after five
years, to become naturalized U.S. citizens. The four principal bases or
doors for admission are family reunification (sponsored by either green
carders or naturalized citizens), skills, diversity, and humanitarian inter-
ests (see Figure 1). By far the largest admissions door is for relatives of
U.S. residents. In 2002, the last year for which there are detailed statis-
tics, about two-thirds (63 percent) of the 1.1 million immigrants were
granted entry because family members already resident in the United
States formally petitioned the U.S. government to admit them. The sec-
ond-largest category of immigrants in 2002 (16 percent) included immi-
grants and their family members admitted for economic or employment
reasons. The third group (12 percent) was that of refugees and asylees.
The final visa class admitted was "other" immigrants (8 percent), over
half of whom were diversity immigrants from countries that have not re-
cently sent large numbers of immigrants to the United States.
During the latter part of the 1990s, about 450,000 immigrants joined
the U.S. labor force each year, accounting for about 25 percent of the
U.S. yearly average increase of 1.7 million. Most of these migrants (90
percent) are chosen on the basis of family, humanitarian, or other criteria
2. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of these policies, see Susan Martin,
Philip Martin & B. Lindsay Lowell, U.S. Immigration Policy: Admission of High
Skilled Workers, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 619 (2002).
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that do not consider labor market factors. During the past twenty years,
there have been persistent calls for a shifting of admission numbers from
family categories, under which many immigrants with less than a high
school education enter, to skills-based ones that attract more highly edu-
cated immigrants. In particular, reformists propose limiting immigration
to nuclear family only.3 Proponents of extended family migration
counter that admission of extended family serves not only humanitarian
purposes but economic ones as well. Extended families often work or
live together, strengthening the household economy of members who
would otherwise live in poverty.
The skilled immigration category is divided into five preferences, or
groupings, each with its own admission ceiling. The highest priority goes
to priority workers or persons of extraordinary ability, outstanding
professors and researchers, and executives and managers of multinational
corporations. The second group includes professionals with advanced de-
grees and workers of exceptional ability. The third group is composed of
other professionals, skilled workers and a limited number of other work-
ers, with the fourth permitting entry of religious workers, and the fifth
including entrepreneurs admitted for activities creating employment.
Unused numbers in higher priority groups can be passed down to lower
priorities.
Not surprisingly, the employment-based immigrants are much better
educated than any other class of immigrants (see Table 1): nearly one-
fifth are in managerial or executive occupations, and another two-thirds
are professionals and technical sales workers (over 80 percent together).
In contrast, only about one-fifth of family-sponsored immigrants are
3. Others agree that the extended family categories should be curtailed but they ar-
gue for their transfer to nuclear family categories that are heavily backlogged.
Currently, spouses and minor children of legal immigrants must wait at least four
years for admission as permanent residents.
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found in these two highly-skilled occupational categories. Diversity im-
migrants, for whom a high school degree is required, are intermediate
with about 45 percent finding work in these two occupational categories.
Refugees for whom there are no economic screens are found most con-
centrated in operators, fabricators, and laborer occupations (41 percent).
TABLE 1. IMMIGRANTS ADMITFED BY MAJOR CLASS OF
ADMISSION AND OCCUPATION. FY2002
Total In Labor Force,
Number 270,636 82,188 46,934 84,851 21,877 28,130 6,656
Not In Labor Force or
Unknown 793,096 403,772 140,135 90,117 20,952 97,954 40,166
Total In Labor Force,
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Executive and managerial 10.8 6.9 8.9 17.6 16.8 1.8 4.6
Professional and technical 29.3 13.3 13.3 63.7 27.9 6.1 4.5
Sales 5.5 6.1 9.9 1.4 7.7 6.8 6.2
Administrative support 4.7 5.0 8.2 1.6 10.7 3.6 3.4
Farming, forestry, and
fisheries 3.3 4.8 8.7 0.4 1.4 0.5 3.6
Operators, fabricators, and
laborers 13.2 13.8 16.9 1.6 6.1 41.7 29.1
Precision production, craft,
and repair 4.9 3.4 4.9 3.7 5.0 11.2 10.8
Service 12.5 11.4 15.0 6.4 20.4 19.8 32.0
Unemployed 15.7 35.5 14.2 3.5 4.0 8.5 5.9
Source: BCIS Yearbook, http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Immigs.htm
Most employment-based immigrants are sponsored by employers.
There are some clear advantages to such a system. Not surprisingly, rates
of employment among these immigrants are very high since they already
have jobs and, generally, a supportive employer. It is also argued that
employers are the best judges of the economic contributions an individual
can make. A checklist, as used in a point system, may identify would-be
migrants with educational or language skills, but arguably these individu-
als may not have more difficult-to-measure capabilities, such as an ability
to work in teams, that employers find valuable.
Because the U.S. system is employer/employee driven and a job offer is
essential, most of those admitted to permanent residence in the employ-
ment-based categories are already in the United States. To hire a foreign
worker as a permanent resident, the employer must undertake a recruit-
ment process that meets Department of Labor (DOL) guidelines and
demonstrates that no minimally qualified U.S. worker is available. The
process normally requires an attorney's help, and the wait for approval
can be several years, first at the DOL and then the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services at the Department of Homeland Security
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(DHS) (which assumed responsibility from the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service). Employers and immigrants are frustrated by the delays,
and tend to use temporary visa categories to bridge the gap between the
decision to hire the worker and the government's grant of permanent res-
ident status. As a result, the recruitment process is often a farce, the
employer having already hired the foreign worker.
The Federal Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR) proposed a
trade-off: employers could more quickly and easily hire the immigrants
they wanted if they paid a substantial ($10 thousand) fee to a fund that
would provide scholarships for U.S. workers willing to be trained to fill
the jobs going to foreigners. CIR argued that market forces would be a
better determinant than the unwieldy bureaucratic process of a business's
need for the foreign worker.
B. TEMPORARY WORKERS
Temporary work categories are increasingly important as the vehicle
for admission of foreign workers, particularly professionals, executives,
and managers. See below for further discussion of the principal admis-
sion category for high skilled professionals, the H-1B visa.
Each year, hundreds of thousand visas are issued to temporary workers
and their family members (Lowell 1999). In addition, an unknown num-
ber of foreign students are employed either in addition to their studies or
immediately thereafter in practical training. The growth in the number of
foreign professionals admitted for temporary stays reflects global eco-
nomic trends. In fast-changing industries, such as information technol-
ogy, having access to a global labor market of skilled professionals is
highly attractive. Also, as companies contract out work or hire contin-
gent labor to work on specific projects, the appeal of temporary visas,
rather than permanent admissions, is clear. Some foreign firms, under-
standing that it may not be possible to undertake an entire project off-
shore, obtain temporary work visas to the United States so their
employees can complete the job at the U.S. client's facilities. The tempo-
rary programs also give employers and employees a chance to test each
other before committing to permanent employment. Multinational cor-
porations find the temporary categories useful in bringing their own for-
eign personnel to work or receive training in the United States.
Over time, a large number of different temporary admission visa cate-
gories have amassed, each referred to by the letter of the alphabet under
which it is described in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The visa
categories now encompass almost the entire alphabet (A-V). The princi-
pal sections under which temporary workers enter are the E visa for trad-
ers and investors entering under bilateral treaties, H1-B for specialty
workers, H-2A for agricultural workers, H2-B for other seasonal workers,
L for intracompany transfers, and J for exchange scholars among others.
Smaller numbers enter under the 0 visa (extraordinary ability in the sci-
ences, arts, education, business, or athletics), P (artist or entertainer), Q
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(cultural exchange and training), and R (religious workers). In addition,
there are visa categories for officials of foreign governments, foreign jour-
nalists, and officials of the United Nations and other intergovernmental
organizations. Professionals, managers, and executives may also enter
under the North American Free Trade Agreement.
As with other immigration matters, there are trade-offs in using tempo-
rary admission categories. While they may help increase business pro-
ductivity and even generate job growth, they also render even highly
skilled foreign workers more vulnerable to exploitation and may, thereby,
depress wages and undermine working conditions for U.S. workers. Gen-
erally, the foreign worker is tied to a specific employer who has requested
the visa. Loss of employment may also mean the threat of deportation.
Moreover, because the temporary visa is so often a testing period, the
foreign professional may put up with any conditions imposed by the em-
ployer, fearing loss of the chance at permanent resident status.
Movement of skilled workers for temporary reasons, at today's levels,
is a new phenomenon for the United States. Statistics on temporary ad-
mission count each and every entry into the United States and, hence, are
oftentimes a multiple count of the same individual. Nonetheless, only
770,000 temporary admissions were counted in the first decade of the
twentieth century, a number that went on to increase to 7 million in the
1950s, and by the last decade of the century, there were some 230 million
temporary admissions. Because these are multiple counts, they reflect
both a stupendous increase in the number of individuals involved, as well
as a significant increase in back-and-forth mobility.
Revolutions in transportation, tourism, and the global economy are
driving a level of temporary international mobility not prefigured by past
experience. To be sure, a substantial fraction of the supposedly "perma-
nent" international flows of yesteryear were actually temporary migrants
or "birds of passage" (Piore 1979). But that dynamic exists today as well.
It is common for "permanent" immigrants to circulate regularly to their
original homeland and many immigrants end up returning home for good
sooner or later. The temporary movement that exists today is fundamen-
tally different because it is not a by-product of otherwise permanent visa
holders. More precisely, policy mechanisms explicitly define it as "tem-
porary" at the outset.
The class of so-defined temporary movement has reached levels that
easily surpass the past or present return movements of legal permanent
residents, as well as exceed the level of permanent immigration itself.
Note that in 1994, the United States counted the admission of 804,000
permanent legal residents. In that same year 5.6 million individual tem-
porary visas were issued and 22 million entries and exits of temporary
visaholders were tallied (State 1994). The only available estimate of
"person years" suggests that this temporary flow generated a year-round
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presence equivalent to at least 1.4 million persons as of 1994. 4 Even the
temporary worker classes have grown significantly and exceed the num-
ber of employment-based permanent admissions.
III. ADMISSIONS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Are permanent admissions categories associated with different integra-
tion outcomes and do U.S. policies, as compared to Canadian policies,
produce notably different outcomes? Keeping humanitarian or refugee
admissions aside, in both nations most immigrants enter to reunify with
family or because their skills are, deemed to fill economic needs. It might
be surmised that the skilled immigrants would perform better in the labor
market, that they would experience more opportunity.
The U.S. system admits employment-based immigrants who must have
advanced education and be sponsored by an employer. Arguably, this
reflects market demand. The immigrant arrives with a job in hand and
assurances to the government from the employer that U.S. workers are
not displaced. The Canadian system's independent stream immigrants
are admitted without sponsors (jobs) based upon points given for things
such as education, occupation, age, and language ability, which make
them economically valuable. In both systems, family immigrants, prima-
rily spouses and minor children or parents, are sponsored by immediate
family members who are already legal permanent residents or naturalized
citizens. Unsurprisingly, the family class tends to have more dependents
and fewer job skills than the economic class.
Primarily due to the absence of a cap on family reunification for citi-
zens, the total number of U.S. immigrants grew in order of magnitude
from 300,000 yearly in the 1970s, to 550,000 in the 1980s, and 800,000 in
the 1990s. In 1990, at the end of an economic up-cycle and with forecasts
of a skill shortage, the cap on admissions was increased 40 percent
(Kramer and Lowell 1992). Family-based immigrants have been more
than two-thirds of the total flow and employment-based immigrants
about one-seventh of the total (refugees make up the balance). Because
of the much larger number of family-based immigrants, a remarkable 250
percent increase in employment-based admissions in 1990 still left that
class at about one-seventh of the overall flow.
Unlike U.S. policy, in which changes in admissions levels occur every
few decades, Canadian admissions levels change following ministerial
consultations. The goal historically has been to set numerical targets that
vary with the economic cycle. The numbers grew toward 200,000 in the
1970s, only to be reduced to just over 100,000 in the mid-1980s, followed
4. Unfortunately, more recent figures on person years do not exist. For technical
reasons, this person-year figure is likely to be substantially too low. See B. LIND-
SAY LOWELL, FOREIGN TEMPORARY WORKERS IN AMERICA: POLICIES THAT BEN-
EFIT THE U.S. ECONOMY (Quorum 1999). Of course, things run both ways.
Another way to look at it is that 40% of the permanent illegal migrants, or about
300,000 yearly, and in addition to the 804,000 legal permanent admissions men-
tioned in the text, are estimated to have first entered as temporary migrants.
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by a robust growth to just shy of 250,000 in the mid-1990s (U.S. CIR
1995). Family immigrants made up an increasing share over that time
period comprising about half of all admissions by 1994, and the indepen-
dent stream about four-tenths (balance refugee). It can be argued that a
fifty-fifty balance of skilled and family admissions will yield a net benefit,
or at least minimize any potential adverse impact by balancing economi-
cally versus non-economically selected immigrants (DeVortz and Layrea
1999).
In both countries, casual examination of official entry or flow data eas-
ily demonstrates that the economic admission classes are more skilled
than are the family class. They hold more professional and technical oc-
cupations, have greater English (French) ability, and higher education.
And in the immediate post-entry period, skill class immigrants have bet-
ter labor market performance than family class (Jasso et al. 1997). How-
ever, it is not clear that, in terms of economic integration, the skilled
admission class will necessarily perform markedly better than the family
class over the longer run. In the first place, immigrants who receive their
education abroad may find themselves underemployed in their adopted
country (Lowell 1996).
On the other hand, the family stream has assets in the connections be-
tween sponsors and the new immigrant that carry over into the labor
market (Lowell 1996). Social scientists refer to their "social capital." Ca-
nadian independent stream immigrants, or the U.S. employment-based
immigrants, have no similar rich network of friends and families upon
whom they can rely for information on jobs or resources in times of
trouble. Indeed, research suggests that family immigrants do experience
upward mobility, while skill-class immigrants may experience downward
mobility following admission (Jasso & Rosenzweig 1990; Richmond
1988).
In other words, family immigrants can translate their social capital into
job mobility. It has been demonstrated that, along with lower entry skills,
family immigrants earn less than skill immigrants at entry. However, this
may motivate family immigrants to invest more in skills training and they
may experience more rapid earnings growth over time than the skill class
(Duleep and Regets 1996). Indeed, Canadian research finds that the
earnings of family immigrants catches up to the independent stream (De-
Silva 1997). Likewise, several studies in the United States find that low-
skilled/family-based immigrants catch up with the employment-based im-
migrants after about ten years (Lowell 1996). 5
5. Recent research finds, however, that there may not be more rapid wage growth
among those who have low-wages upon entry compared to those who have higher
entry wages. George J. Borjas, The Economic Progress of Immigrants (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 6506, 1998). To the extent that
family class immigrants catch up, which the Canadian and U.S. literature together
suggests has been the case, the mechanisms may not yet be fully understood. The
results may also be confounded by measurement issues such as greater return mi-
gration of successful skill class immigrants, but greater return migration of unsuc-
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Does the Canadian system produce immigrants who are, by measures
of skills and earnings, better integrated? The introduction of the Cana-
dian point system in 1967 has been shown to have favorably affected the
occupations of immigrants (Green and Green 1995). Other research sug-
gests that the Canadian point system is more successful in increasing the
average skills of entrants than is the U.S. employment-based system
(Green 1995). So it does appear that the large incoming Canadian inde-
pendent stream has higher skills than the U.S. employment-based
immigrants.
Does this advantage hold up in the settled population? An early study
using the 1980 and 1981 U.S. and Canadian censuses finds that the for-
eign born in Canada are younger and possibly more fluent, but that they
are not more educated than U.S. foreign born (Duleep and Regets 1992).
Research using censuses that bridge the 19 70s, on the other hand, sug-
gests that the introduction of the point system in Canada did increase
skills, but that this was because it altered the national origin mix of Cana-
dian immigrants (Borjas 1993).
Research with the 1990 and 1991 U.S. and Canadian censuses carefully
compares working-age foreign-born males to natives within each country.
It finds that, on average, the Canadian foreign born are more fluent in
English (French), more educated, and have greater earnings relative to
natives than U.S. foreign born (Antecol et al. 1999). This comparative
research lends itself to the conclusion that the combined average of immi-
grants from different nations is better in Canada than in the United
States. But note that these findings are based on a comparison of the
average native and the average foreign-born worker (Antecol et al.
1999). When the average is broken down and comparisons are made for
the foreign born from the same national origins, there is little difference
between native and foreign born in Canada versus the United States.
Comparisons of human capital within national origin group appear simi-
lar. This suggests that the Canadian system does not do a markedly bet-
ter job than the U.S. system in bolstering average skill levels.6
In short, and in lieu of needed and more precise research, this discus-
sion raises a number of intriguing and surely controversial hypotheses
regarding admission policy and economic integration. First, class of ad-
mission per se, family or skilled, may make little difference in the even-
tual labor market success of immigrants. Skilled admission classes have
an initial advantage, but family-based immigrants have a longer-term set
cessful family class immigrants. Although it can be argued that this is just the
opposite of what on might expect.
6. Certain nationalities will tend to enter predominantly as family or skill class, but
unless almost all within a national origin group do so, then this conclusion is most
likely. There is no guaranteed way to verify this conclusion because census data do
not identify class of admission. The U.S. average does appear to reflect the large
numbers of less skilled or less educated migrants who arrive, many without author-
ization, from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. The legalization program
of the 1980s gave more than 3 million unauthorized migrants legal status and has
allowed them to petition for the admission of family members.
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of assets that may serve them well. Second, which follows in part from
the above, the Canadian independent/point system, at least as assessed
for any given nationality group, does not appear to generate markedly
better economic characteristics than the U.S. system. Third, a unique set
of historical, geographic, and admission priorities favor a large immigra-
tion of poorly educated Mexicans and Central Americans to the United
States. Despite recent research that suggests that these populations are
successfully integrating into the U.S. labor market (Smith 2003), the
greater bulk of the research literature suggests they experience serious
limitations to their economic advance (Fry and Lowell 2006; Edmonston
and Smith 1997).
IV. TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS: A NEW PARADIGM?
Whereas much of the research and policy discussion of the economic
performance of high skilled workers focuses on permanent admissions, as
discussed above, an increasing share of these workers are entering
through temporary admission categories. Skilled workers have long been
admitted to the United States under an H-1 visa that was created in the
early 1950s. Originally, the visa required that the job a foreign worker
filled be temporary and that the foreigner established the intent to return
home. Since then, the double temporary provisions of this nonimmigrant
visa have been removed. Employers have been able to hire for perma-
nent positions since 1970 and, with the introduction of the H-1B visa in
1990, the worker may have the dual intent to stay either temporarily or
permanently. As one might expect, these changes are associated with ex-
pectations of permanency on the part of many employers and foreign
workers.
In the Immigration Act of 1990, the U.S. Congress imposed restrictions
on the growing use of the H visa that were intended to protect the domes-
tic worker. Originally, the visa had no numerical limitations and few la-
bor protections. In 1990, a numerical cap of 65,000 new H-1Bs per year
was imposed. A numerical cap is intended to dampen escalating demand
for foreign workers and encourage internal market adjustments that are
in the best long-term competitive interests of the U.S. economy (e.g., in-
creased training, better wages and working conditions, new technologies,
or innovative production strategies).
Demand for the H-1B has indeed continued to grow. Today, this re-
flects demand for the visa largely by the rapidly-expanding information
technology (IT) sector. It reflects, too, the growth in supply of foreign-
born IT graduates from U.S. colleges, the changed nature and appeal of
the visa, and procedural backlogs faced by those who would prefer admis-
sion via the permanent system that make the H-1B an easier alternative.
In recent years, employer demand for H-1Bs has been such that the nu-
merical cap was exceeded before the year ran out.
In response, Congress raised the cap twice since 1998. Primarily as the
result of lobbying by the information technology industry, the U.S. Con-
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gress passed the American Competitiveness and Work Force Improve-
ment Act (ACWIA). That legislation, beginning in October of 1998,
provides an increase in the number of available H-1B visas from 65,000
per year to 115,000 per year in 1999 and 2000, and 107,500 in 2001. The
ACWIA was set to sunset in three years, unless the US Congress voted to
extend it. However, Congress did not extend the cap in the wake of the
tragic events of 9/11 and, more concretely, the recession of 2001 and the
"jobless recovery" that extended through 2003. The numerical limit has
returned to 65,000 for fiscal year 2002, but events overtook that. While
the components of ACWIA are worth noting, they were superseded by
yet another act (see below) that increased the cap, but which, upon sun-
setting in 2003, vitiated the progressive elements of ACWIA's labor mar-
ket protections.
As a trade-off to those who opposed increased numerical limits, AC-
WIA included new worker protections for so-called H-1B dependent
firms, for example, those most likely to unfairly exploit the specialty
worker at the expense of U.S. workers. Dependent firms are defined as
those with a certain percentage (around 15 percent) of their workforce
who are H-1Bs. ACWIA also had a requirement that H-1B workers re-
ceive the same fringe benefits as U.S. workers. The Act required an addi-
tional $500 fee for petitions filed, since increased to $1,000, and provided
for new investigative procedures and new penalties for violations. The
bulk of the fee went toward the training of displaced workers and schol-
arships for low-income students. Employers such as universities, feder-
ally-funded research institutes, etc., were exempted from the fee.7
While employers welcomed the increase in the H-1B cap in ACWIA,
the numbers proved to be insufficient given backlogs carried over from
prior fiscal years and ever-growing demand. By the end of December
1998, 59,108 of the 115,000 H-1B visas available for fiscal year 1999 had
been used; 19,431 of the visas were issued to migrants whose applications
were held over from the last fiscal year, and 39,677 were new cases. In-
deed, available visas under the cap ran out before year's end in 1999. In
fiscal year 2000, the available visas also ran out and the INS stated it
would process no new applications by midyear. In response, Congress
once more passed legislation, the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 (ACTFA), which increased the ceiling
to 195,000 and exempted certain categories of employers, particularly
universities and research centers, from numerical limits.
Of course, subsequently, there was a sharp downturn in the fortunes of
information technology and large layoffs in the "dotcom" industries and
elsewhere. While concerns with U.S. security may someday improve data
gathering capacity, there are currently no data to confirm journalistic
claims that H-1Bs are either the first or the last to be fired. One can
7. In fact, under the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of
2000 (ACTFA), H-lBs to such nonprofit institutions were, and remain, exempted
from the overall cap and their numbers have reached 20,000 and more.
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speculate that temporary workers can be less costly or burdensome to
employ in a risky economy since the employer offers no long-term com-
mitment. Indeed, demand for H-lBs remained strong, but not at the
levels seen during the economic boom. According to DHS, "During FY
2003, the Congressionally-mandated cap of 195,000 beneficiaries was not
reached and about 78,000 individuals, mostly initial beneficiaries, were
counted against the cap. The corresponding number for FY 2002 was
79,000" (DHS 2003).
In the fall of 2004, Congress failed to extend the cap which, as of this
writing, has reverted to 65,000. With its demise, so too were the provi-
sions for H-1B dependent employers and training programs eliminated.
The FY 2004 cap was reached in March 2004 and no new applications are
now being accepted by DHS.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MORE SKILLED
TEMPORARY WORKERS
Business interests clamor for more H-1Bs with a few often compelling
arguments. These tend to boil down to the IT sector's hold on the na-
tional imagination. While only eight percent of the U.S. labor force, this
sector is estimated to generate about one-third of the recent strong pro-
ductivity gains in the New Economy (USDOC 2000). The core IT sector
alone has grown 47 percent from 1.5 million to 2.2 million between 1995
to 2000, and today comprises over one-third of all scientific and engineer-
ing jobs (Ellis and Lowell 1999). When even casual observers noted a
tight labor market in all sectors of the economy, coupled with the IT sec-
tor's special aura, the calls for more H-1Bs seemed irresistible. Indeed, it
was only the advent of the recession and the loss of some 200,000 IT jobs
that took away the IT industry's willingness to contest ACTFA's sunset.
A variety of parties oppose any increase in temporary high-skilled visas
at all, or at least increases that fail to incorporate substantial labor protec-
tions or training. Traditional opponents to increases come from advo-
cates for U.S. labor, as well as careful observers who see no strong
analytic evidence for shortages in the IT sector. Labor organizations
point to prevalent anecdotes about the exploitation of H-1Bs and claim
that they undercut domestic wages. The analysts point out that despite
well-known plaints from employers, average wage growth in IT has not
been spectacular. Unemployment in IT has risen slightly in the past year,
albeit remaining at about half the national average. Debate rages over
whether or not domestic supplies of IT workers are or will be enough;
after all, economists argue, supply would meet demand if wages were
raised. At the height of the recession in 2003, IT workers' unemployment
spiked to over 5 percent, or almost to the national average. Wage growth
moderated for all IT workers and, in fact, H-1Bs competing for visa re-
newals in the United States (that is, visa extensions) saw their average
wage drop by 6 percent (Lowell 2004).
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These core contestants in the debate primarily use economic argu-
ments. Without an increased supply of foreign H-1Bs, business interest
groups claim, domestic workers will be unavailable at any cost, hurting
the industry's legendary productivity. They also say they will have to get
the work done abroad if they do not get more H-1Bs. Those opposed
note the soft nature of the shortage estimates and would welcome in-
creased wages for domestic workers, while arguing that going offshore is
in fact an inevitable process as the IT industry itself shifts toward more of
a "commodity" market (e.g., software and services).
A third set of actors to the debate is motivated not by economic argu-
ments per se, but by the implications for the system of permanent admis-
sions. Proponents of higher levels of H-1B visas castigate opponents of
more H-1Bs as restrictionists who they claim do not like immigrants. In
fact, some of those who oppose more H-1Bs would preferentially admit
most foreign workers as permanent residents. They call for fixing the
permanent system before meddling with the temporary; last year, ineffi-
cient U.S. agencies processed only 61,000 applications for permanent ad-
mission out of the legal cap of 140,000. There is clearly room in the
permanent system for expansion.
VI. TRADE-OFFS AND BALANCING INTERESTS
Each actor in the debate has some truth, the relative strengths of which
gain political momentum during economic expansion (business) and re-
cession (worker advocates). Nonetheless, what is lacking is a balancing of
the truths with an eye toward the national interest that, for our purposes
here, can be reduced to the successful management of foreign worker
programs. Hence, success is defined as meeting employers' legitimate
needs and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy while protecting do-
mestic workers, along with administrative efficiency and transparency.
Employers are by-and-large good actors, and their need for highly skilled
foreign workers is legitimate. Yet, current worker protections are expos-
ing too many to abuse.
Business actors in the IT sector are correct that aliens meet a need for
the best and the brightest (Ellis and Lowell 1999). As mentioned above,
the IT sector has grown significantly and much of that growth has come in
the highly trained occupations of computer scientists and engineers, not
programmers. At the same time, U.S. enrollment and graduate rates in
computer sciences dipped in the early- to mid-1990s, and enrollment only
began to climb in the last part of that decade. More graduates are a
couple of years off, but the numbers have continued to increase. In the
meantime, the supply of foreign (and domestically) trained alien workers
offers an alternative. Just over one-third of natives in the core IT occupa-
tions do not have even a college degree, while four-tenths of foreign IT
workers have a Masters degree or higher (as compared to just one-sev-
enth of natives).
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As discussed below, labor advocates are correct that the many anec-
dotes about abuses of H-1Bs add up to realistic concerns. Consider con-
tingent jobs (undesired and/or temporary) in the IT industry-Using
Bureau of Labor Statistics' measures that tend to understate the situa-
tion, it can be shown that 5 percent of IT jobs are contingent. This is
often out-contracted work bereft of benefits, and earnings are an as-
tounding 46 percent less than for otherwise similar core (permanent) IT
workers (Lowell and Taylor 2000). What is more, while wages increased
roughly 19 percent for core IT workers during this period, there was ab-
solutely no wage growth in the contingent sector. The H-1B policy ap-
pears to contribute to this phenomenon with a disproportionately high
share (13 percent) of recently arrived foreign IT workers holding contin-
gent jobs. In today's truly sizable IT labor force, unscrupulous parties at
the periphery exploit too many H-1Bs and undercut mainstream
employers.
Similarly, immigrant advocates are correct that increases in the number
of H-1Bs pose serious challenges. Estimates indicate that there are likely
as many as 500,000 in the H-1B workforce as of 2001 and about half are
working in the core IT industry, population (i.e., stock) figures that have
changed little even through the recession (Lowell 2004). Indeed, fully
one-quarter of yearly growth in the IT workforce has come from H-1Bs.
The estimates also indicate that at least half and as many as two-thirds of
H-lBs intend to stay in the United States. But given the overall and per-
country caps on the permanent system-even as changed by ACTFA that
permits the per-country limits to be waived under certain circum-
stances-it is likely that the system can absorb far fewer H-1Bs than de-
sire permanent status. This will increase the number exposed to
exploitation and leave more to face an uncertain future. If they are una-
ble to find a sponsor for permanent status, they will be required to return
home at the end of their visa stay. If they are fortunate enough to have a
pending application for a green card, they will remain in limbo with year-
to-year extensions of their stay.
Weighing the evidence suggests that there is a real need for highly-
trained foreign professionals. But it is unclear that the best way to meet
this need is by expanding temporary admissions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
At present, the United States remains the favored destination for mil-
lions of highly skilled foreign workers, but its continued competitiveness
in attracting the best and brightest will require substantial changes in im-
migration policies and administrative mechanisms. An increasing propor-
tion of highly-skilled workers enter through temporary categories with
little prospect of permanent residence within a reasonable period. The
numbers involved are very significant and the pressures that drive them
are likely to continue over the near future. This is not simply an IT con-
cern, although we can confidently forecast resumed strong labor demand
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in that sector. Global transformations and ongoing record-low unem-
ployment rates throughout the economy have generated calls from sev-
eral other sectors in the U.S. economy for more guest workers and
immigrants. While these calls were subdued following the tragic events
associated with the terrorist bombings of September 2001, they are highly
likely to be heard again when the economy rebounds. It remains to be
seen, however, whether or not Congress and the Bush Administration
will see the big picture or continue to muddle through with ad hoc re-
sponses to episodic economic and political demands.
Congress should undertake reform of the permanent system. When
employers are asked, they report that they would prefer to sponsor per-
manent resident visaholders (Lowell 1999). The permanent class is pref-
erable from the vantage of domestic safeguards because the immigrant is
a free agent able to negotiate and leave an employer if he or she so
chooses. And permanent admission is core to the American tradition of
successful integration; supplementing that tradition with large popula-
tions of floating temporary visaholders runs serious risks.
Straighten out the system of permanent admissions and that possibility
would be available for many. Some efforts have been made to streamline
processing, but the results fall far short of what is needed for an efficient
system. The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, in DHS,
has the most serious backlogs. Total pending applications reached
5,208,051 in January 2004, a 7 percent increase when compared to January
2003. There are more than 1.2 million applications pending for adjust-
ment to permanent residence, the mechanism through which temporary
workers are able to become permanent immigrants. Serious considera-
tion should be given to improved, simpler labor protections and user fees
that are directly reinvested into administration of the program.
After reforming the permanent system, Congress should rethink what
is required for a successful temporary program in the future. The so-
called dependent employer clause would screen out potentially abusive
employers and offers one simple protection. Congress should reassess
the transitional nature of the visa as well. Under current law, workers
may intend to stay permanently and the stay is essentially for six years (or
more under new provisions that allow workers to remain if their green
card is under review), hardly a length of time that even the most casual
observer would think of as temporary. It would be best to be honest with
foreign workers and employers by requiring that the visaholder demon-
strate intent to return home at the end of their visa stay, and to limit the
duration of that stay to a more reasonable period.8 Structured in this
8. Such requirements would not disbar an H-1B visa holder from ultimately applying
for a permanent slot, but the requirements would be transparent in so far as they
would not promise what cannot be assured. The argument that dual intent was
given to permit employers to screen H-lBs makes sense only if the program re-
mained the small program that it once was (and not one dominated by one or two
national origin groups). Today's large-scale temporary program outstrips the ca-
pacity of the permanent system to absorb temporary visa holders.
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way, there is room for generous numbers that should be subject to change
based upon some agreed upon labor market indicators. Under these con-
ditions, a large-scale temporary program would retain transparency and
operate without causing disequilibrium and inequities. 9
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